What duties does a notary (or lawyer) have when witnessing a signature on a document, such as a land transfer document, to ensure that the person signing the document understands that document and is voluntarily signing it? What if you are only retaining this person for the limited purpose of witnessing your signature because the document must be notarized?

In Engman v. Canfield 2023 BCCA 56, a notary witnessed a signature on a Form A Transfer document, which transferred her 20-acre property to a third party. The notary only witnessed the signature (and was paid $50 for his services). It turned out that the transfer was part of an unconscionable purchase and sale agreement, and the transferor was “situationally vulnerable” when she signed the document. She was elderly, had health problems, and was feeling pressure to sell. She was also deprived of important information when she agreed to the sale, and the agreement was the product of unequal bargaining power and was an improvident bargain. However, the notary was not aware of any of this.

When the transferor was not paid for her property, she brought a claim against various defendants, including the notary (who she sued for negligence). At trial, the notary was held liable for $465,000 in damages, which was the fair market value of the property at the time of the transfer.

At trial, the Court found that the notary owed the transferor a duty to act with reasonable care when he witnessed her signature, and he breached that duty by not inquiring into the transferor’s capacity, her understanding of the form, the voluntariness of the transfer, or that she received independent legal advice.

The B.C. Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, and dismissed the action in negligence against the notary.

The notary argued that he was merely an “officer” witnessing a signature on a Land Title transfer form, and so he had very narrow responsibilities to confirm the identity of the person signing the form and confirm this was the person named in the form, and witness that person’s signature on the document.

The Court of Appeal did not accept this. The notary was acting in his role as a notary public, and there are standards established for his profession, including urging unrepresented persons to obtain independent legal advice, and if they fail to do so taking care to make sure the person is not under the impression that their interests would be protected by the notary. The Court of Appeal held that the Land Title Act and the notary’s professional guidelines required him to go beyond confirming the identity of the signatory and the fact that the signature on the document belongs to that person. For example, the guidelines provide that notaries should make sure the signature is given voluntarily, and the signatory is aware of the significance of the transaction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of the trial judge that the notary breached his standard of care. However, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal of the finding of causation. The trial judge found that had the notary insisted that the transferor receive legal advice before he witnessed the form (which he was supposed to do), she would have avoided the loss. The notary argued that this was conjecture, and that the loss would have been suffered in any event.

A defendant is not liable in negligence unless their breach caused the plaintiff’s loss. In some cases, causation can be established by inference, but it cannot be guesswork or conjecture. The Court of Appeal held that there were too many unknowns about what would have happened if the notary had met the standard of care, and that the transferor failed to establish on a balance of probabilities that had the notary made in proper inquiries and declined to witness the Form A because of the responses, the transferor would have acted in a different manner. The other evidence in the case showed that the transferor had capacity, and was not interested in seeking legal advice about the inherent risks.

The appeal was allowed that the claim in negligence against the notary was dismissed.

If there are suspicions transfers during the deceased’s lifetime, these can be scrutinized and investigated after the death of the deceased. A personal representative ought to consider whether any large transfers should to be challenged, on the basis that a gift was not intended, or that the transfer is otherwise invalid (i.e. due to undue influence, lack of capacity).

In Schwab Estate v. Warriner 2023 BCSC 220, the deceased died from a fentanyl overdose at the age of 47. He had two children, aged 11 and 9. The deceased did not leave a will.

There was a dispute as to whether the defendant was living in a marriage-like relationship such that she was a “spouse” of the deceased. If she was a spouse, she would get a share of the estate under an intestacy. If she was not a spouse, then the children would get the entirety of the estate. It was held that the defendant was not a spouse. This is a highly fact-specific inquiry. I discuss the issue of consideration of spousal status in other posts, for example here.

The second issue in Schwab Estate related to a transfer of $350,000 from the deceased to the defendant four days before his death. The deceased sold his home five weeks before he died, received $800,000 from the sale, and provided a $350,000 bank draft to the defendant.

The defendant argued that the deceased owed her money, and the $350,000 draft was to pay her back. She said that the deceased owed her money for being the primary bread-winner for the years they were together. She gave evidence that there was an agreement between her and the deceased about the approximate amount of the debt and what he was to repay to her.

The court rejected this claim. The Court did not accept the defendant’s testimony, and the documents (in particular bank records) did not assist with her position. There was no evidence of an agreement to pay, and there was no evidence that the amount that would have been payable was $350,000. The Court relied upon the testimony of a witness who described a conversation which suggested that the deceased did not consider that he owed the defendant any money. The bank records also showed that the deceased attended to payment of other debts that he discussed with other parties (including a debt to his drug dealer).

As a result, the transfer was gratuitous and the presumption of resulting trust applied. The defendant failed to establish that the deceased intended to gift her the funds. The evidence was that the deceased intended to gift the funds, potentially with the deceased’s brother. There was also evidence that the deceased intended to shield the monies from the mother of his children.

The Court also held that the transfer was procured by undue influence. The deceased did not transfer the $350,000 of his own full, free and informed thought. The deceased was vulnerable as a result of his ongoing drug addiction, health condition, and paranoia about the mother of his children.

The funds had been spent without an accounting, and so they could not be simply returned. Instead, the court awarded the deceased’s estate damages in the amount of $350,000. The Court also awarded punitive damages in the amount of $50,000, for using her position for her own profit, and spending all of the money with no accounting.

I have previously discussed that gifts are irrevocable, and so a donor cannot change their mind and seek to take back property that they have gifted. However, the Court may set aside a gratuitous transfer if it was procured by undue influence, whether that be intentional influence or unintentional influence.

In Sandu v. Sandu 2023 BCSC 323, the Court considered the transfer of property in 2016 from a husband and wife to their youngest son. The property was the parents’ only substantial asset. The transfer was purportedly a gift, and no consideration was paid by the son. The parents later requested that their son transfer title to the property back into their names, and he refused to do so.

In this case, the Court ordered that the transfer be set aside, and title be restored to the parents.

At the time of the transfer, the father was 91 years old and the mother was 88 years old. Neither of them received any formal education, neither of them spoke or read English, and both of them were functionally illiterate in their mother tongue of Punjabi. They had always been completely dependent on family members for assistance with written transactions. In fact, their eldest son was appointed as their litigation guardian for the trial of the action.

Equity presumes bargains over gifts. Where property is transferred to another without consideration, the presumption of resulting trust applies. The onus is on the transferee to rebut the presumption by demonstrating that a gift was intended.

In B.C., section 23(2) of the Land Title Act provides for a statutory presumption of indefeasibility – the idea that registration of title is conclusive evidence at law and in equity that the person named on title is indefeasibly entitled to an estate in fee simple in the land. In other words, the registered owner is presumed to be the true beneficial owner of the property.

However, the presumption of indefeasibility can be rebutted, including by the existence of a resulting trust, and also if the registered owner took their interest by the exercise of undue influence. There can be no gift where the transfer was made under undue influence.

There are two branches of undue influence for inter vivos transfers:

1. intentional or actual undue influence; and
2. unintentional or presumed influence.

The first branch is characterized by the influencer’s conduct, and may include:

• “overt and violent threats (give me the house or I’ll beat you…);
• “subtle forms of persuasion (give me the house or I don’t know if I’ll be able to look after you anymore…)”;
• persistent requests for the property ultimately disposed of; or
• exploitation of the donor’s desire to keep the family peace.

The second branch recognizes unintentional undue influence, which is to be presumed if:

• there is a “potential for domination” given the nature of the relationship between the parties (this includes solicitor/client, parent/child, and guardian/ward relationships);
• the defendant unduly benefited or the plaintiff was unduly disadvantaged, but only if the transaction is commercial.
• If the plaintiff establishes circumstances that trigger the presumption of undue influence, the defendant has the onus of rebutting it. To rebut the presumption, the defendant must show that the plaintiff entered into the transaction with full, free and informed thought.

The receipt of independent legal advice may be a critical factor.

In Sandu, the Court observed that in the context of intergenerational relationships involving care, undue influence is a particular concern.

The Court held that it did not need to determine whether their was actual undue influence (the first branch), as there was a presumption of undue influence (the second branch) which had not been rebutted. The Court considered whether the parents received independent legal advice, and determined that what limited advice they received did not constitute adequate legal advice. The mere presence of legal advice is insufficient.

Finally, the presence of undue influence meant that the limitation period to bring the claim had not expired. In cases of undue influence, the time does not begin to run to bring a claim until the donor can be said to have been freed from the sphere of undue influence. As a result, while more then two years had passed since the transfer, in effect the limitation period was extended while the parents remained under the influence of their son.

In B.C., a spouse or child (including an adult independent child) can bring an action to vary a will if they believe it does not make adequate provision for them. However, a wills variation claim can only seek a greater share of assets which form part of the estate. If assets pass outside of the estate, they are not available to claim against in a wills variation claim.

As a result, some will-makers take steps to deplete their estate so that there are no assets available for the purpose of a wills variation claim. This may include registering assets in joint ownership with right of survivorship, direct beneficiary designations, or inter vivos transfers (gifts during the will-maker’s lifetime).

Disappointed beneficiaries must first succeed in attacking these planning steps and “returning” the assets to the estate for the purpose of the wills variation claim. This may include claims that the assets are held in resulting trust for the estate, or claims attacking the validity of the transfers (lack of capacity, undue influence, etc…).

A recent example can be found in the B.C. Supreme Court decision in Franco v. Franco Estate 2023 BCSC 1015. In Franco, the deceased father took certain planning steps during his lifetime. He transferred property, proceeds of sale of property and monies from bank accounts to one of his children, and changed his will to leave the entirety of his estate to that child (and to name that child as executor). As a result, his other two children (the plaintiffs in the action) did not receive a share of the transferred assets, and were disinherited under the will. If the planning and transfers were upheld, it would mean that there would be very little in the estate available for a wills variation claim.

The defendant argued that her father validly gifted assets to her. There are two requirements for a legally binding gift:

1. the donor must have intended to make a gift and must have delivered the subject matter to the donee. The intention of the donor at the time of the transfer is the governing consideration.
2. The donor must have done everything necessary, according to the nature of the property, to transfer it to the donee and render the settlement legally binding on him or he

Where a parent makes a gratuitous transfer to an independent adult child (as was the case in Franco), the presumption of resulting trust applies. The transferee must prove on a balance of probabilities that the transferor intended the transfer as a gift.

The most compelling evidence is direct evidence of the transferor’s intention at the time of transfer. Post-transfer conduct may be relevant, but must be approached with caution as it may be self-serving (or show a change in intention).

The Court in Franco held that the fact that the deceased continued to deal with jointly-owned property unilaterally does not cause the gift to fail. Continuing control and use of the property by the transferor after the transfer is not necessarily inconsistent with a gift.

The Court held that documentary and affidavit evidence established an intention to gift. The evidence included transfer documents, a deed of gift document, bank account documents, and the affidavit evidence of the defendant, the deceased’s niece, and the deceased’s financial advisor.

The Court also found there was no undue influence.

As a result, the Court concluded that the gifts were valid, and the assets passed outside of the estate. The parties agreed that if the claim relating to the gifts failed, the wills variation claim would not be pursued (because there were insufficient assets in the estate to justify the action). Accordingly, the plaintiffs’ claims were dismissed.

 

When a party wishes to allege undue influence, they must consider the cost consequences if this claim is unsuccessful.

A common question from parties to estate litigation (or any litigation) is whether the other side can be ordered to pay their costs. After a claim is determined on its merits, the court must decide upon the issue of costs.

The general rule is that costs follow the event, meaning that the successful party will receive costs payable by the unsuccessful party. However, in estate litigation the court may order that the costs of some or all parties be paid from the estate. The court will look at whether the litigation resulted from the conduct of the deceased (i.e. how they chose to set up their estate plan) or the conduct or motivations of a beneficiary.

In addition to who gets their costs, and who pays those costs, there is the issue of the scale of costs. In the ordinary course, costs are determined using a tariff system set out in the B.C. Supreme Court Civil Rules. However, the costs payable under this system are significantly less than a party’s actual legal fees, often a quarter or a third of the actual legal fees.

In some cases, a party can apply for “special costs”. Special costs are increased costs, which are intended to more closely resemble the reasonable fees actually charged by a lawyer to their client. Special cost awards are intended to address the conduct of a party. Special costs are awarded only in exceptional circumstances, where the conduct of the party is deserving of rebuke.

There are a number of cases in which special costs have been awarded in the face of unproven and unsubstantiated allegations of undue influence. This is because the allegation of undue influence is a serious one, impugning the character of another person. It has been compared to allegations of fraud, which also may attract an award of special costs if unfounded.

The B.C. Supreme Court recently considered this issue and the line of authority in Lambrecht v. Lambrecht Estate 2023 BCSC 1051. In Lambrecht, the Court observed that the primary considerations in previous cases were that allegations were pursued based on speculation, without foundation, and unduly prolonged the proceedings. In one case, costs were awarded where the allegations were only abandoned three days before trial.

In Lambrecht, the plaintiff advised before trial that he agreed to withdraw his claim of undue influence. Although the notice of civil claim was not amended to reflect this agreement, the court was advised of the concession at trial. The defendant argued that despite this agreement, the plaintiff continued to make assertions that the defendant acted improperly which were, in substance, allegations of undue influence, which the defendant was obliged to defend, and which the plaintiff knew had no chance of success.

The Court agreed with the plaintiff. Although the pleadings were not amended, the plaintiff advised that he would not pursue the claim of undue influence, and he maintained that position at trial. Even though the plaintiff was not successful in the claim that he did pursue (in resulting trust), that alone was not sufficient to warrant an order for special costs.

This case is an important reminder that if you are unable support allegations of undue influence which you make in your pleadings, you should carefully consider whether you want to pursue those allegations at trial. If you withdraw the allegations of undue influence far enough in advance, you can potentially avoid a special costs award that would otherwise be payable for making the unfounded allegations.

It should be noted, however, that the plaintiff was ordered to pay double costs because he failed to accept a formal offer to settle which was reasonable and ought to be accepted (triggering double costs under Rule 9-1 of the B.C. Supreme Court Civil Rules).