Month: April 2026

Civil Contempt in Estate Litigation: Court Orders are Not Optional

April 27, 2026

For executors, trustees, and estate administrators, a recent decision of the British Columbia Supreme Court serves as a useful reminder: court orders in estate matters are not suggestions.

In Bringeland Estate (Re), 2026 BCSC 356, the Court addressed a former executor’s failure to comply with orders requiring her to deliver estate assets and records and to pass her accounts. The result was a finding of civil contempt, fines totalling $10,000 (with further fines contingent on continued non-compliance), and an order for special costs.

Background

A deceased’s will divided his estate equally between his two children. One child, Dawne Bringeland, was appointed executor. Years later, the other child, Hal Bringeland, successfully applied to have her removed and replaced her as executor.

Following her removal, the Court ordered Ms. Bringeland to:

  • deliver all estate assets and records to Mr. Bringeland; and
  • apply to pass her accounts.

Ms. Bringeland did not comply with those orders.

Approximately a year later, Mr. Bringeland brought a contempt application. That application was unsuccessful — not because there had been compliance, but because the earlier order did not specify a deadline. The Court nevertheless found Ms. Bringeland to be in breach and issued new orders with clear timelines and directions for compliance.

Several months passed. Ms. Bringeland still did not comply. A second contempt application was brought. She did not attend the hearing.

Civil Contempt Orders

The purpose behind contempt orders is to uphold the authority of courts. Where a person does not comply with court orders, a civil contempt order may be considered. Consequences can be significant; a finding of contempt may result in committal and/or fines to ensure compliance.

The power of a court to make a civil contempt order is discretionary. It is considered to be an ‘extraordinary order’ that should only be used ‘cautiously and with great restraint.’ Even where the elements of contempt are established, a court may still decline to make an order.

The governing test was set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in Carey v. Laiken, and requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that:

  • the court order in issue was clear and unequivocal;
  • the party had actual knowledge of it; and
  • the party intentionally failed to comply.

Application

The Court in Bringeland found that each of the required elements for civil contempt were met for the orders made after the first contempt application. The Court concluded that it should exercise its discretion to make a civil contempt order and impose fines to “maintain and foster respect for the role and authority of courts,” and enforce the court’s orders in the face of Ms. Bringeland’s continued and deliberate non-compliance.

The resulting orders included:

  • A declaration that Ms. Bringeland was in contempt of court;
  • A $10,000 fine, pursuant to Rule 22-8 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules, payable to the Province within 14 days as a penalty for being in contempt of court;
  • That the contempt of court could be purged by providing the required documents within 30 days, failing which an additional $5,000 fine would follow;
  • That the contempt of court could be purged by applying to pass accounts within 30 days, failing which an additional $5,000 fine would follow; and
  • special costs payable.

Bringeland makes clear that while contempt is an extraordinary remedy, it may become necessary where other measures have failed to secure compliance.

Key Takeaways

  • Court orders must be complied with. Estate administrators who are ordered to deliver records or pass accounts are not at liberty to delay or ignore those obligations.
  • If an order is disputed, the appropriate course is to appeal or seek to vary it — not to disregard it.
  • For those seeking enforcement, the decision illustrates both the challenges and the potential path forward when dealing with sustained non-compliance.

 

 

Applications By Trustees For Directions: Court Declines to Entertain Questions that go to Construction of a Trust

April 20, 2026

Under section 86 of the Trustee Act, and a Court’s inherent jurisdiction, trustees in British Columbia may seek the court’s opinion, advice, or direction on legal questions relating to the management and administration of a trust. However, there are limits. Courts will not permit these avenues to be used as a vehicle to construct, re-write or circumvent the terms of a trust.

That limit was recently articulated in Re: The Jack Leshgold Family (2009) Trust, 2026 BCSC 388 (“Leshgold Trust”), where the Court dismissed a petition framed in administrative terms, but which in substance sought to vary the fundamental terms of a trust.

Full disclosure: my colleague, Betony Rowland, and I acted for the respondent, who successfully opposed the petition.

Background

Leshgold Trust involved a family trust (the “Trust”) settled in 2009 by Leiba Leshgold. She and her husband, Jack Leshgold, were successful property developers in the Lower Mainland of B.C.. The Trust held significant interests in two development companies with real estate assets valued at over $1 billion.

After Ms. Leshgold’s death in 2013, Jack acted as sole trustee until his death in 2024.

On his death, the Trust provided for a three-trustee structure operating by majority:

  • one appointed by their daughter, Susan;
  • one appointed by their son, Robert; and
  • one independent trustee.

The independent trustee was to be appointed by a majority of Susan, Robert, and the most senior non-family officer of Reliance Properties Ltd. (one of the Trust’s principal assets).

Susan became concerned that the Reliance officer—who held the tie-breaking role in appointing the third trustee —might favour Robert. She proposed amending the Trust to replace that mechanism with an experienced independent lawyer acting as an “expert” appointer.

Robert took the position that the Trust permitted amendments only to “administrative provisions,” and that the proposed change was not administrative.

Susan brought a petition under s. 86 of the Trustee Act (and alternatively, the Court’s inherent jurisdiction), asking whether the definitions of “Independent Trustee Appointer” and “Independent Designated Trustee” in the Trust were “administrative provisions” capable of amendment—and, if so, to implement her proposal.

Robert and his sons, as beneficiaries, opposed. They argued the Court lacked jurisdiction to answer what were, in substance, questions of trust interpretation and variation.

The Law: Limits of Section 86 and Inherent Jurisdiction

Section 86 permits a trustee to seek the Court’s opinion, advice, or direction on questions respecting the management or administration of trust property. Similarly, the Court’s inherent jurisdiction allows it to guide trustees on administrative matters and their obligations.

Section 86, and the jurisdiction of the court, has its limits, even on matters that are truly related to administration and management; I’ve written previously on this topic – here.

However, it is a clear line that Courts will not use s. 86 – or inherent jurisdiction – to:

  • engage in the ‘construction’ of a trust instrument or to amend its operative terms; or
  • Determine issues affect the rights of beneficiaries under a trust to trust property.

This relief is intended to assist trustees with what the case law describes as “little matters of discretion” —not to resolve disputes about the structure or fundamental terms of a trust.

Application

The Court agreed with the Respondents in Leshgold Trust and held that the petition fell outside both s. 86 and the Court’s inherent jurisdiction. On a jurisdictional basis the petition was dismissed.  Despite its framing, the petition did not raise administrative questions. In substance, Susan sought to vary the Trust’s terms – without beneficiary consent –  by recasting core provisions as “administrative.”  The questions asked the court to engage in the construction of the trust instrument, and went to the fundamental mechanism of trustee appointment and therefore Settlor intention.

Although unnecessary to the result, the Court went on to address the merits in the alternative.  The Court concluded it would have answered both questions in the negative. The definitions ‘Independent Trustee Appointer’ and ‘Independent Designated Trustee’ in the Trust were not “administrative provisions” capable of amendment by the trustees.

Reading the Trust as a whole, the Court found the Settlor did not intend to permit the amendment of the mechanism by which the independent trustee was appointed. To allow the proposed changes would be to “circumvent and frustrate” the clear intentions of the Settlor.

Key Takeaways

  • Section 86 is not a workaround for trust variation. Courts will not entertain applications framed as administrative where the substance is interpretation or alteration of the trust instrument.
  • The jurisdiction of the court in this area is confined to answering true legal questions regarding the management and administration of trust property (or assisting trustees with ‘momentous decisions’).

 

Disabled Adult Children and Wills Variation in B.C.: Wols v. Funk and the Duty to Make Adequate Provision

April 13, 2026

British Columbia’s wills variation regime places limits on a will-maker’s freedom to dispose of their estate as they see fit. Under the Wills, Estates and Succession Act (“WESA”), courts may vary a will that fails to make adequate, just and equitable provision for a child or spouse.

While a will-maker’s moral obligation to independent adult children has often been described as “tenuous,” a different — and heightened — standard applies where the claimant is an adult child living with significant disabilities. The recent decision in Wols v. Funk, 2026 BCSC 404, is an illustration of that principle.

Background

Wols involved a wills variation claim brought by the Public Guardian and Trustee as litigation guardian for the deceased’s only child.

George Wols died in 2021. He was predeceased by his wife in 2014, and survived by his son, Gerald (“Gerry”) Wols.

Under a 2014 will:

  • Gerry was to receive approximately 25% of the estate; and
  • Mary and Ewald Funk were to receive the remaining 75%.

The estate was valued at approximately $490,000. No reasons were provided by George for this distribution.

The Funks were not family members. Their relationship with the Wols began in 2006 through paid housekeeping services, but also developed into a personal relationship over time. They were named as executors in the will.

Gerry, age 64 at trial, lived with lifelong and significant cognitive and physical disabilities. He had never been capable of independent living and resided in a care facility. He relied on government benefits that provided only a subsistence level of support. The evidence established that even modest additional resources would materially improve his quality of life.

Legal Framework

Section 60 of WESA permits a court to vary a will that does not make adequate provision for the proper maintenance and support of a child.

The analysis is objective. Courts assess whether the will meets the will-maker’s legal and moral obligations, measured against contemporary community standards. The central question remains: what would a “judicious parent” do in the circumstances?

In claims by adult children, the focus is typically on moral obligations. Courts in B.C. have identified a number of factors for assessing the existence and strength of moral obligations owed to adult children. I have written previously on those factors and they are listed here.

Importantly, B.C. courts have repeatedly recognized that a will-maker owes an enhanced moral obligation to a child with disabilities, as compared to an independent adult child.

Certain arguments advanced in this context have been rejected by courts in B.C.:

  • Subjective intention: the fact a will-maker considered the circumstances of their child with disabilities and obtained legal advice is not determinative. The test is objective – whether the provision meets “society’s reasonable expectations of a judicious parent.”
  • No competing moral claims from non-spouses/children: worthy friends, caregivers, and extended family do not attract legal or moral claims under WESA – or the court’s consideration when assessing a child’s claim.
  • Availability of government benefits is not a defence: the test is not “needs-based” or measured at the subsistence standard. A will-maker’s obligation is not satisfied or diminished by the availability of public funding, which may in any event be uncertain.

Application in Wols v. Funk

The Court had little difficulty concluding that the will failed to make adequate, just and equitable provision for Gerry.

The Court considered:

  • There was no estrangement or misconduct in the parent-child relationship;
  • George’s estate was not so large as to justify the provision made for Gerry relative to that made for the Funks;
  • Gerry lived at a subsistence level, and additional funds would materially improve his life;
  • There was no evidence explaining George’s decision to limit Gerry’s share;
  • Gerry’s disabilities rose to the level that he would never be able to live independently and his needs had increased over time, requiring additional support;
  • There were no competing legal or moral claims — the Funks, while supportive and involved, did not qualify.

At the same time, the Court acknowledged that the Funks had played a meaningful role in George’s life, and that some recognition of his testamentary wishes was appropriate.

The will was therefore varied to provide:

  • 80% of the estate to Gerry; and
  • 20% to the Funks.

The result reflects the balance at the heart of WESA: testamentary autonomy yields where necessary, but is not entirely displaced.

Key Takeaways

  • Enhanced obligation: Will-makers should be advised by drafting solicitors that courts will generally expect increased provision for adult children with disabilities, even relative to other potential beneficiaries.
  • The existence of government benefits for a child with disabilities will not insulate a will from variation.
  • Objective standard: Courts apply a “judicious parent” test grounded in contemporary norms — not the will-maker’s subjective intentions.
  • A child’s entitlement under WESA will not be displaced by non-child/spouse beneficiaries, even deserving ones.

B.C. Case Comment: Capacity to Revoke a Will

April 6, 2026

I’ve recently written about how a diagnosis of moderate to severe dementia impacts a court’s assessment of testamentary capacity in the context of preparing a will. But, how does dementia factor into an alleged revocation of a valid will?

In Jugovits Estate (Re), 2026 BCSC 269, the B.C. Supreme Court was asked not only to determine whether a will had been revoked shortly before death, but also whether the deceased, who was hospitalized with Alzheimer’s disease, had the legal capacity to do so.

Background

Laszlo Jugovits executed a will in May 2021; in his will, he left $275,000 in cash gifts to four stepdaughters, and the residue of his estate to his son, Laszlo Jr. The primary asset was his home, valued at approximately $1.3 million.

In September 2023, Mr. Jugovits was admitted to hospital and was suffering with symptoms of Alzheimer’s disease; he was unable to stand, and had minimal hand strength – described as “claw hands.” On October 26, 2023, a treating physician wrote that he lacked capacity to direct his care, make health care decisions or manage his finances due to major neurocognitive disorder. He died in hospital on November 22, 2023.

Laszlo Jr. gave evidence that in late October 2023 his father asked him to retrieve documents from home, including what he later believed to be his original will. He observed a phone call between his father and his lawyer (which he recorded in part), after which the deceased tore the will almost in two, and stated in English, “I want to change my will.” The deceased asked Laszlo Jr., to place the torn will in his hospital bedside table; he was later unable to find it. Another witness gave evidence that she observed the deceased rip up papers and say he wished to change his will.

Other evidence placed the intact original will in Laszlo Jr.’s possession after his father’s death. A stepsister and her daughter testified that on January 14, 2024, Laszlo Jr. attended their home with documents and indicated he had located the original will. Both testified that they observed a document labeled “Last Will and Testament” that did not have any “Copy” marking. The stepsister gave evidence that Laszlo Jr. asked her not to tell anyone what she saw. The conversation with Laszlo Jr. was partially recorded.

The certified copy of the will was circulated two days later, and the executor sought probate. If revocation were established, the estate would pass on intestacy — entirely to Laszlo Jr.

Law on Revocation and Testamentary Capacity

Under Section 55(1)(c) of WESA, a will is revoked where a will-maker burns, tears or destroys all or part of their will (or directs someone to do so in their presence), and does so with the intention of revoking all or part of it.

At common law, where an original will cannot be located, and was last known to be in the deceased’s possession, a presumption arises that it was destroyed with intent to revoke. I have previously written about the presumption of revocation and its practical implications (here). Where it applies, the burden of proof shifts to the person denying revocation to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the original was merely lost or misplaced.

However, the presumption does not operate where there is evidence that the will-maker became mentally incapable after the will was executed. In those circumstances, the party alleging revocation must prove on a balance of probabilities that the will was revoked and that the testator had testamentary capacity.

Whether a deceased had testamentary capacity to revoke a will is a legal, not medical, determination. A dementia diagnosis is not determinative; a person declared medically incapable may still meet the legal test. But dementia that rises to the level that doctors declare a testator incapable will attract careful judicial scrutiny (see my prior discussion on this and the legal test for testamentary capacity here). In the revocation context, the Court must be satisfied that the deceased meets the testamentary capacity criteria and had a reasonable understanding of the implications for their estate and beneficiaries when they revoked their will. No lesser standard applies because a revocation is a ‘simpler’ act.

Application to the Case

The Court concluded that the presumption of revocation did not assist Laszlo Jr., because ample evidence cast doubt on the deceased’s capacity at the time of the alleged revocation; he held the burden of proving revocation and capacity. The Court observed that it is inherently suspicious in the revocation context when the person who stands to benefit from a revocation is the same person who witnesses or participates in it.

On the evidence, the Court was not satisfied that the will had been destroyed. Laszlo Jr. was an interested witness, standing to gain if revocation were found. Recorded interactions and the testimony of the stepsister and her daughter were persuasive and Laszlo Jr.’s explanation that he misunderstood what documents he had were not accepted. The Court was also not persuaded that the deceased, with his physical limitations, had the ability to tear the will in half.

In the alternative, even if the Court were wrong about revocation, it concluded that the deceased lacked testamentary capacity in late October 2023. The medical evidence from the treating doctor, Laszlo Jr’s recordings of conversations with the deceased, including one with his lawyer, raised questions about capacity and whether he was being unduly influenced. The Court found the evidence did not demonstrate that the deceased had a considered appreciation of the consequences of revoking the gifts to his stepdaughters.

The Court admitted the certified copy of the will to probate.

Key Takeaways

  • The presumption of revocation does not always apply where the original Will is missing. Where testamentary capacity is in doubt, the party alleging revocation must prove both revocation and capacity.
  • Revocation does not attract a lower legal threshold for finding testamentary capacity.
  • Allegations of “deathbed revocation” in the context of advanced dementia should be closely examined, particularly where a beneficiary stands to gain and is involved in the act.