What is the legal effect when a parent adds only some of their children as joint tenants on title to a property?

This issue arises frequently in estate litigation. Disputes often occur when one child is added to the title of a parent’s property or a bank account as a joint tenant with right of survivorship, while their siblings are not. These cases turn on whether the parent intended the asset to pass to the named child directly, or whether the child was instead holding the property ‘in trust’ for the parent’s estate.

The distinction is important. If an asset passes by survivorship, it falls outside the estate and is not distributed under a will/intestacy (and may avoid wills variation claims).

Where an adult child is added to title gratuitously, the law presumes they hold the beneficial interest for the parent during life and for the parent’s estate on death. However, this presumption can be rebutted if the evidence shows the parent intended a gift, including a gift of the right of survivorship.

The B.C. Supreme Court recently considered this scenario and the applicable legal principles in Rodrigues v. Berlinguette, 2026 BCSC 671.

Background

The dispute concerned five siblings and their late mother’s home.

Marlene Berlinguette purchased the subject property in 1992. Her son Albert (a plaintiff) was added to title as a tenant in common to assist with mortgage qualification.

In 2008, Albert was removed from title (with his consent) due to concerns about tax debt and potential creditor enforcement. Marlene obtained a new mortgage and added three of her children – the defendants, Kellie, Lorne, and Rene – onto title as joint tenants. The defendant children were also co-signors on the mortgage.

While the defendants resided with Marlene in 2008, they did not pay for their registered interests in the property. Marlene paid the mortgage, property taxes, and major expenses. The defendant’s contributions to household costs were occasional and limited. All the defendant children viewed the property as their mother’s home.

Over the years, Marlene consistently expressed that any child (or grandchild) of hers who needed a home would always have a place to live with her. By 2008, the plaintiffs, Albert and Cherie, had stable homes and spouses, while the defendant children remained with their mother.

Marlene died intestate in 2017. The defendants remained in the property for several years following her death. It was later sold in the context of civil forfeiture proceedings arising from Rene’s criminal conduct. The proceeds were ultimately used by Kellie and Lorne to purchase a home in Harrison in their names alone.

The plaintiffs claimed the property (and its proceeds) belonged to the estate under a resulting trust. The defendants claimed it passed to them by survivorship.

The Law

The governing authority in this area is the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Pecore v. Pecore, 2007 SCC 17 .

In Pecore, the Court held that where a parent gratuitously transfers property to an adult child in joint tenancy, the law will presume a resulting trust in favor of that parent and their estate upon death.

To rebut the presumption of a resulting trust, the adult child bears the burden of proving a gift was intended on the balance of probabilities. The relevant period for determining the parent’s intention is at the time of transfer (and not death).

Pecore recognized three possible situations involving jointly held property between a parent and an adult child:

• a true joint tenancy, where both parties share legal and beneficial ownership;
• a resulting trust, where the adult child holds legal title only, while the beneficial interest remains with the parent or the parent’s estate; or
• a gift of the right of survivorship, where the parent keeps beneficial ownership during their lifetime but intends the surviving joint tenant child to receive the property outright upon death.

Courts consider all relevant direct and circumstantial evidence of intention surrounding the circumstances of the transfer. If the actual intention of the parent cannot be determined, then the presumption of resulting trust is applied and resolves the uncertainty in favour of the estate.

Application to the Case

The Court found the 2008 transfer was gratuitous. The defendants did not contribute to the purchase and despite co-signing the mortgage did not assume meaningful financial risk.

The Court nevertheless held the presumption of resulting trust was rebutted.

The evidence showed Marlene’s overriding concern was ensuring her children would have a home if they needed it. In 2008, Albert and Cherie were established in their own homes, while the defendant children continued living with her.

The Court accepted that Marlene deliberately structured ownership as a joint tenancy both to protect the property from creditor claims and to ensure Kellie, Lorne, and Rene would receive the home by right of survivorship.

The Court noted that Rene brought no credit, income, or assets to support the mortgage. It found the only rational explanation for Marlene placing him (and Kellie and Lorne) on title was to ensure a place to live after her death.

The Court found Marlene intended to retain beneficial ownership during her lifetime, while gifting the right of survivorship to the defendants.

The action was dismissed, and the property did not form part of the estate.

Key Takeaways

• Joint tenancy alone does not determine beneficial ownership of an asset – gratuitous transfers from parents to adult children trigger the presumption of resulting trust.
• The adult child bears the burden of proving a gift or gift of survivorship was intended at the time of transfer.
• The law recognizes that a parent can retain beneficial ownership during their lifetime while simultaneously gifting a right of survivorship to their child.

 

In British Columbia, individuals often take steps to move assets outside of their estate during their lifetime as part of their estate plan.  There are various reasons why this is done: to ensure their wishes are fulfilled, to avoid potential wills variations claims, to minimize probate fees, or to seek more preferential tax outcomes for their families. There are several ways people can move assets outside of their estates – including through the making of gifts during their lifetimes, called inter-vivos gifts.

But what happens when someone has made a gift of a significant asset and later changes their mind? Can a demand be made that a gift be returned?

This issue was recently considered by the B.C. Supreme Court in Satguru Ram Singh Satsang Charitable Foundation v. Akalirai, 2026 BCSC 717 (“Satguru”).

Background

In 2018, Ms. Akalirai executed a deed of gift transferring her interest in her Vancouver home to the Satguru Ram Singh Satsang Charitable Foundation (the “Foundation”), a registered charity and society. The Foundation was associated with a temple of which Ms. Akalirai was a frequent attendee. Under the terms of the transfer, Ms. Akalirai retained the right to reside in her home for her lifetime. She was 86 years old at the time of the transfer.

In 2019, Ms. Akalirai received a charitable donation receipt in the amount of $1,625,000.

In 2021, Ms. Akalirai requested that the Foundation return the interest in the property to her.

The Foundation brought a petition to the B.C. Supreme Court seeking declarations from the Court regarding whether there was any legal basis for return of the property.

The evidence before the Court consisted primarily of affidavit evidence which gave conflicting versions of events.

Ms. Akalirai alleged that the donation was made under duress and the gift was invalid. She claimed that though she felt a spiritual need to donate, she had been pressured into the transfer by her son-in-law, whom she alleged had close ties to the Foundation. She gave evidence that she was emotionally vulnerable at the time, struggling following the murder of her grandson, and that she did not fully understand the legal implications of the documents she signed.

The evidence of the other witnesses sharply contradicted her account.

Ms. Akalirai’s daughter gave evidence that her husband (who had passed away prior to the petition) had no involvement in Ms. Akalirai’s financial or legal affairs and no involvement in the decision to donate the property. He was not affiliated with the Foundation and attended a different temple altogether.

The Director of the Foundation at the relevant time also gave evidence that Ms. Akalirai herself initiated discussions regarding donating her home and that he encouraged her to carefully consider the decision and obtain independent legal advice before proceeding. Independent legal advice was ultimately obtained, and the lawyer who advised Ms. Akalirai provided a certificate confirming the same.

Inter Vivos Gifts and Duress

To establish a valid inter vivos gift:

1. The donor must have an intention to donate – intention must be present at the time of the transfer;
2. The donee must accept the gift; and
3. There must be sufficient delivery of the gift by the donor to the donee.

A donor must possess the legal capacity to make the gift. The capacity required to make an inter vivos gift is generally less stringent than that for testamentary capacity. A valid gift must also be free from duress and undue influence. I’ve written recently on undue influence – here.

Allegations of duress must be proven by the party asserting them. As stated by the Court in Satguru “(d)uress normally involves a threat of an unlawful or illegal action made to compel the innocent party to enter the contract”; it involves coercion that ‘vitiates’ consent.

Once a gift is completed (and is not invalid, including for the reasons above) it is final and cannot be retracted, nor can a donor later dictate how the property is to be used. A donor may only retain the ability to later alter the terms of a gift or impose future directions if those rights are expressly reserved at the time the gift is made.

In other words, a donor cannot later change the terms of the gift or seek its return simply because they regret their decision.

Application to the Case

The Court preferred the evidence of Ms. Akalirai’s daughter and the Director of the Foundation.

Ms. Akalirai failed to establish that she had made the gift of her home to the Foundation under duress. While Ms. Akalirai regretted her decision to gift her home, regret alone was insufficient to invalidate an otherwise valid inter vivos gift.  The Foundation was under no obligation to return the property.

Takeaways

This decision serves as an important reminder that a validly completed inter vivos gift is irrevocable.

Individuals considering transferring significant assets as gifts during their lifetime — particularly real property — should carefully consider the legal consequences before doing so. Once the essential elements of a gift are satisfied (and absent duress, undue influence, lack of capacity etc, or expressly reserved rights) a donor will not be permitted to later reclaim the property or change the terms, simply because they have changed their mind or their circumstances have changed.

 

You may have recently seen coverage of the decision of the B.C. Supreme Court in Beckman v. Vinci et al., 2026 BCSC 559 – it was reported on by CTV News and the National Post. The facts are striking, but the case is also a useful illustration of gratuitous transfers, the presumption of resulting trust, and undue influence – all concepts that come up regularly in estate litigation in British Columbia.

Background

Doug Beckman is a successful Kelowna entrepreneur living with Huntington’s disease; a progressive, incurable neurological disease that causes both motor and cognitive impairment, including progressive dementia and resulting difficulties with judgment, planning, impulse control, decision-making, and insight.

By 2017, the cognitive effects of Mr. Beckman’s condition were apparent to those close to him. Friends, advisors, and his CFO encouraged him to obtain additional support. The defendant, Karen Vinci, was hired as his personal assistant at $5,000 per month to assist with errands, daily tasks, and companionship. At the outset, the evidence at trial established that she was informed about Mr. Beckman’s condition, its cognitive effects, and cautioned not to accept significant financial benefits.

The Court found that the relationship between Mr. Beckman and Ms. Vinci became “more social than professional” almost immediately. Within a month, Mr. Beckman became infatuated and repeatedly told her he loved her. They spent significant time together – travelling (including multiple trips to Maui), dining, and shopping, often in circumstances where alcohol was involved. There was evidence that Ms. Vinci commented that Mr. Beckman was easier to manage when drinking.

During the COVID-19 period, Ms. Vinci and her family became Mr. Beckman’s primary social circle; he rarely saw his own children. Against that backdrop, financial transfers began.

Between April 2020 and April 2022, Mr. Beckman transferred approximately $5.1 million to the defendants. The funds were used to purchase multiple properties in Kelowna (and one in Ottawa) in the names of Ms. Vinci and her family members, and to fund extensive renovations of Ms. Vinci’s residence. Despite being advised by her ex-husband to document any gifts — and having draft gift letters prepared — Ms. Vinci never asked Mr. Beckman to sign them.

The Court found that Mr. Beckman’s friends, advisors, and CFO were intentionally kept unaware of the transfers.

When one transaction — the Ottawa condominium — came to light in 2021, the CFO warned Ms. Vinci that accepting such a transfer was a serious breach given Mr. Beckman’s vulnerability and directed that the property be transferred to Mr. Beckman’s holding company. Ms. Vinci agreed, but did not follow through and did not disclose the other transfers.

One witness testified that Ms. Vinci told her that she planned to work for Mr. Beckman for a limited period so that she and her family would be financially “set up.”

Ms. Vinci’s employment was terminated for cause in April 2022, after Mr. Beckman said he realized he was missing millions, and when Ms. Vinci was seeking an additional $1.7 million.

Mr. Beckman commenced an action to recover the transferred funds. Ms. Vinci counterclaimed for wrongful termination, and for sexual assault and battery.

Were the Transfers Loans?

Mr. Beckman argued that the transfers were undocumented loans — “handshake deals.” The Court rejected that argument. There was no evidence of any loan agreements and no circumstantial evidence supporting such an arrangement (such as documentation, security, or repayment). The alleged arrangement was also commercially implausible — it made little sense to loan millions of dollars to a person earning approximately $60,000 per year.

The Presumption of Resulting Trust

I have written previously on this topic. Where a transfer is made gratuitously, the presumption of resulting trust arises: the law presumes that the recipient holds the property in trust for the transferor unless the recipient can show, on a balance of probabilities, that a gift was intended at the time of the transfer and the transferor had capacity to make a gift.

In considering whether the presumption had been rebutted, the Court had serious concerns about the credibility and reliability of the defendants’ evidence, and outright rejected Ms. Vinci’s evidence where it was not corroborated by reliable evidence. The defendants relied largely on their own testimony that Mr. Beckman was cognitively sharp and unimpaired — despite evidence to the contrary — as well as limited documentation, including references to “gifts” in text messages.

The absence of signed gift letters — particularly where they had been prepared and Ms. Vinci had been advised to obtain them — was significant to the Court, which inferred that Ms. Vinci did not pursue them because she believed Mr. Beckman would not sign. The Court also found it implausible that an employer would gift more than $5 million to an employee of less than four years.

The presumption of resulting trust was not rebutted.

Undue Influence

In the alternative, the Court concluded that if the transfers were gifts, they would be set aside for undue influence.

I have written previously on this topic. Undue influence is an equitable doctrine used to protect persons from victimization. It focuses on the relationship between the parties — specifically, whether one party is in a position to dominate the will of another, meaning that they are in a position “to exercise a persuasive influence.” Where that potential is established, undue influence is presumed and the burden shifts to the recipient to show the transfer was the result of a full, free, and informed decision.

The hallmarks of undue influence are vulnerability and dependence; medical incapacity is not required.

In assessing whether a transfer was the product of a free decision, courts may consider factors such as the opportunity to exercise influence, whether independent advice was obtained, the donor’s ability to resist influence, their understanding of the transaction, and the magnitude of the benefit conferred.

The Court found that Ms. Vinci “was in a position to dominate Doug’s will” and concluded that she saw him as an opportunity to improve her family’s financial position. That finding is consistent with the broader evidence at trial regarding how she approached the relationship and the benefits she sought to obtain from it.

The presumption of undue influence applied and was not rebutted.

Other Claims

Ms. Vinci’s wrongful dismissal claim was dismissed. The Court found that she had been properly terminated for cause.

A claim for sexual assault succeeded in part, with damages assessed at $15,000.

Takeaways

This decision is a straightforward but important application of established principles:

• Where transfers are gratuitous, the presumption of resulting trust will apply. The burden is on the recipient to prove donative intent — and that requires clear evidence. Documentation matters. The absence of signed gift letters, particularly where they were contemplated, can be a significant factor.
• Where a vulnerable person is involved, context is critical to the undue influence analysis. Lack of independent advice, secrecy, and the scale of the transfers will all be important considerations.
• Beckman is a clear example of the type of fact pattern that engages – and demonstrates the reasons for – the operation of these equitable presumptions.